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I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, a company will raise money by issuing securities 
that represent equity in the company or, in the case of debt securities, 
entitle the holders to claims for repayment. Sometimes payment of 
these claims is secured by a lien on certain of the company's proper-
ties. In each case, the security holder looks primarily to the company 
for repayment. If the company becomes financially troubled, or bank-
rupt, payment of the securities may be jeopardized, or at least 
delayed. 
Structured finance can change the securityholder's dependence 
on the company for payment, by separating the source of payment 
from the company itself. In a typical structured financing, a company 
that seeks to raise cash may sell certaih of its assets to a special pur-
pose vehicle or trust (hereinafter called the "SPV") that is organized 
in such a way that the likelihood of its bankruptcy is remote. The 
"sale" is accomplished iIi a manner that removes, to the e,:,tent practi-
cable, these assets from the estate of the selling company in the event 
of its bankruptcy. The result is that the assets are no longer owned by 
the selling company, but by the bankruptcy remote vehicle or trust. 
The assets themselves are typically payment obligations, such as ac-
counts or other amounts receivable, owing to the company from 
creditworthy third parties. (In this article, these payment obligations 
are generically referred to as "receivables.") 
The SPY, and not the selling company, will issue securities to 
raise cash. These securities are intended to be payable from collec-
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tions on the receivables purchased by the SPY. A potential buyer of 
the securities therefore looks to the cash flow from the purchased re-
ceivables, and not necessarily to the credit of the selling company, for 
repayment. 
This separation of the selling company (hereinafter called the 
"originator," because it usually originates the receivables) from the 
receivables themselves can enable the originator to raise funds less 
expensively, through securities issued by the SPY, than it would cost 
to raise funds through securities issued directly by the originator. In 
addition, as illustrated in the attached chart, I the cash that is raised 
will not require an offsetting liability to be shown on the originator's 
balance sheet; from the standpoint of the originator, the cash repre-
sents proceeds of the sale of receivables to the SPY. 
If the originator is a bank or similar financial institution that is 
required to maintain risk based capital under the recent capital ade-
quacy guidelines,2 securitization also could permit the originator to 
sell assets (for example, loans reflected as assets on the bank's finan-
cial statements) for which it would otherwise be required to maintain 
capital. This reduces the bank's effective cost of funds. 
Furthermore, an originator may be restricted by its indenture 
covenants from incurring or securing debt beyond a specified level. A 
structured financing may enable the originator to raise cash in compli-
ance with such covenants, because the originator may be selling assets 
and not incurring or securing debt. (Whether a structured financing 
would violate particular covenants requires a case-by-case inquiry.) 
II. HISTORY 
The first structured financings, identified as such, started in the 
early seventies with the securitization of pools of mortgages. Initially, 
mortgages were originated by savings and loan associations. These 
institutions depended heavily on core deposit flows for funds to fi-
nance local housing demand. When the housing credit market col-
lapsed during the Depression, Congress reacted by passing the 
National Housing Act of 1934, intended in part to create a secondary 
market in mortgages. To this end, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association ("FNMA" or "Fannie Mae") was established in 1938 to 
provide liquidity for mortgage investment by purchasing mortgages 
when funds are in short supply, and selling mortgages when funds are 
plentiful. As the nation's demand for housing increased after World 
1 See Appendix. 
2 See Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State Member 
Banks: Leverage Measure, 12 C.F.R. § 225, app. B (1989). 
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War II, a capital shortage developed, and alternative capital streams 
were needed to finance the growing housing industry. In 1957, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board created a credit reserve system for 
savings and loan associations by permitting the purchase and sale of 
participations in interests in mortgage loans. 
The first structured financing came in 1970 when the newly cre-
ated Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA" or 
"Ginnie Mae") began publicly trading "pass-through" securities. In a 
mortgage pass-through security, the investor purchases a fractional 
undivided interest in a pool of mortgage loans, and is entitled to share 
in the interest income and principal payments generated by the under-
lying mortgages. Mortgage lenders originate pools of mortgages with 
similar characteristics as to quality, term and interest rate. The pool 
is then placed in a trust. Then, either through a government agency, a 
private conduit or direct placement, certificates of ownership are sold 
to investors. Income from the mortgage pool passes through to the 
investors. 
In recent years, many different types of assets have been the sub-
ject of securitization. Where the securities issued by the Spy are pub-
licly issued, and where rating agencies-such as Standard & Poors 
and Moody's-rate these securities, the assets purchased by the SPY 
tend to be payment streams that have proven histories of past pay-
ment and predictable expectations of future payment. Examples 
would include pools of mortgage loans, trade receivables and credit 
card receivables. 
On the other hand, where the securities are privately placed, and 
in some recent transactions as the rating agencies become more com-
fortable with the credit issues involved with securitization, the assets 
purchased by the Spy are becoming more creative. For example, re-
cent deals have included payment streams consisting of franchise fees, 
leases, subrogation claims and even utility surcharges. 
III. DEFINING THE SOURCE OF REPAYMENT 
As can be seen, the common thread is that the receivables 
purchased consist of a payment stream as to which there is a reason-
able predictability of payment. Collections on the receivables would 
be applied to pay principal and interest on the securities issued by the 
-SPY. 
Predictability of payment is affected by the nature and identity of 
both the obligors on the receivables and the originator, and also by 
the nature of the receivables themselves. From the standpoint of the 
obligors, there are two risks: delay in payment (sometimes referred to 
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as "slow pay"), and default in payment (sometimes referred to as "no 
pay"). 
The "slow pay" risk is that the obligors on the receivables may 
delay in making their payments. A holder of securities issued by the 
SPY would not be pleased to learn that his monthly or quarterly inter-
est payment was not made because an obligor delayed his payment. 
For this reason, the number of obligors on the receivables should be 
large enough to maintain statistical assurance that, even if a reason-
ably expected number of obligors delay in making their payments, the 
securities issued by the Spy will be paid on time. 3 
The "no pay" risk is that the obligors on the receivables may 
default in making their payments. This risk in tum depends upon 
several factors. The obvious factor is the financial ability of the obli-
gors to pay the receivables: an obligor might not pay because it is 
bankrupt or otherwise having financial problems .. An obligor also 
may have a defense to payment.4 Therefore, the number of obligors 
on the receivables again must be large enough so that the risk of de-
fault can be statistically determined. 
There are, however, certain factors that can impair the validity of 
a statistical analysis. It may be that a relatively small number of the 
obligors (counting, for this purpose, affiliated obligors ~s a single obli-
gor, because default by any given obligor may signify financial trouble 
for the affiliates of that obligor) account for a disproportionately large 
amount of payments under the receivables. Default by these obligors 
might impair the ability of the security holders to be repaid. This risk 
of high concentrations of payments by a relatively small number of 
obligors is called, naturally enough, the obligor concentration risk. 
The default risk therefore can be managed by the SPY buying 
receivables having a statistically large number of obligors, and by ana-
lyzing the obligor concentrations. The financial ability of the obligors 
to pay, and the possibility that the obligors may be able to assert de-
fenses to payment, also would be considered. The default risk then 
may be addressed by the originator's adjusting the sale price of the 
receivables to take into account anticipated defaults. 5 Alternatively, 
3 Even payment streams that are uncertain as to precise timing of collections may be able 
to be securitized if a credit facility (referred to as a liquidity facility) is provided to advance 
funds to the SPY to pay debt service if collections are temporarily delayed. While the security 
holders obtain comfort as to timing of collection, a liquidity facility does not necessarily pro-
tect the security holders in the case of larger than anticipated defaults. 
4 The rights of a transferee of receivables may be subject to obligor defenses. See V.C.C. 
§ 9-318(1) (1989). 
5 There are various ways to compute the purchase price. The most straightforward is to 
discount the outstanding balance of the receivables to be purchased. taking into account antici-
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or in addition, the default risk may be addressed by credit enhance-
ment. This can take various forms, such as a guaranty, a letter of 
credit, an irrevocable credit line, or third party purchasing a tranche 
of subordinated securities from the SPV.6 The goal is that a 
creditworthy third party assures payment of all or a portion of the 
securities issued by the SPV.7 
Predictability of payment also depends on the nature and identity 
of the originator. A financially troubled originator is more likely to 
go bankrupt, thereby raising the question whether the transfer of its 
receivables is a sale for bankruptcy purposes. If a court holds the 
transfer not to be a sale, the ability of the SPY to receive collections 
on the receivables will be delayed and may be seriously impaired. 
This is discussed in greater detail in Part IV(B). 
Finally, predictability of payment may depend on the nature of 
the receivables themselves. For example, where the receivables con-
stitute obligations owing for goods sold or services rendered (the stan-
dard trade receivables), there are few defenses to payment. Perhaps 
some of the goods sold will tum out to be defective, or some of the 
obligors will tum out to be minors. But in general a buyer of the 
receivables can anti~ipate the delinquency and default risks based on 
past collection patterns. 
This type of predictability may not be obtained if the receivables 
represent payment for future performance obligations of the origina-
tor. A good ~xample is franchise fees. These are amounts payable 
pated defaults and delays in collection. If the discount is too small, however, the SPV's securi-
tyholders could suffer a loss. But if the discount is too large, the originator would be under-
pricing its receivables. Sometimes the discount is intentionally small, but the SPV has a degree 
of additional recourse (a "loss reserve") against the originator or against additional receivables. 
Other times the discount is intentionally large (sometimes referred to as "overcollateraliza-
tion"), but the originator retains a right to certain excess collections if the actual defaults do 
not turn out to justify the large discount (payment of a "holdback"). The purchase price also 
could represent a small discount, with the originator absorbing a portion of the risk by 
purchasing a tranche of subordinated securities from the SPV. These are merely examples. 
The method of pricing that is selected will depend on business and credit considerations that 
are beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that the more straightfor-
ward the method of pricing, and the more the SPV bears some risk ofioss, the more likely it is 
that the sale of receivables will be considered a true sale for bankruptcy purposes. See discus-
sion in Part IV(B)(I) below. 
6 See generally Schwarcz & Varges, Guaranties and Other Third Party Credit Supports, in 
Commercial Loan Documentation Guide (1989). 
7 A rating agency that rates the SPY's securities would want the third party to be at least 
-as creditworthy as the rating on the securities. The third party providing the credit support 
would want to be comfortable, as a business matter, with the ability to be repaid from the 
originator or its assets. If the third party has a claim for repayment that is enforceable against 
the originator or its general assets (as opposed, for example; to a subrogation claim limited to 
the receivables sold), the transaction may appe~r to provide a form of indirect recourse against 
the originator. Cf. supra note 5 and Part IY(B)(I). 
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from obligors, called franchisees, to a franchisor (the originator) in 
return for the license to run a business using a special tradename or 
trademark and selling designated products or services. 8 
Franchise fees may not be payment obligations at all but merely 
expectations of payment. These fees may be calculated, for example, 
by a percentage (or other formula) of the franchisee's monthly or 
other periodic revenues or profits. If there are no revenues or profits, 
no franchise fee is payable. Also, if the franchisor (orig~nator) fails to 
perform the contractually agreed upon franchise services, the fran-
chisee may have a legal defense against payment of franchise fees. 
In addition, in the case of bankruptcy of the originator, the origi-
nator (or its trustee in bankruptcy) may have the right, under section 
365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,9 to reject, or terminate, the 
franchise agreement as an executory contract. An executory contract 
is any contract where substantial performance remains due on both 
sides, such that breach by one party of its performance obligations 
would excuse the other side's obligation to perform. \0 A franc~ise 
agreement may well be this type of a contract. lI Accordingly, an 
originator that becomes the subject of a bankruptcy case may be able 
to terminate the contract if it has business reasons to do SO.12 
The rejection of an executory contract by an originator in bank-
ruptcy would subject the originator to a claim for damages for breach 
of contract. This damage claim, however, has no priority and ranks 
on a parity with the originator's general unsecured claims. Presuma-
bly the claim would be worth less (perhaps far less) than 100 cents on 
8 See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 592 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of franchise). It is typi-
cal for franchise agreements, and indeed many other types of long-term contracts, to contain 
prohibitions on assignment. This should not, however, prohibit the assignment of the right to 
payments made thereunder. Even if the contract purports to prohibit the assignment of rights 
thereunder, such prohibition should be ineffective as a matter of law in most cases. See V.C.C. 
§ 9-318(4) (1989) and Official Comment No.4 thereunder. 
9 II U.S.c. § 365 (1988). 
\0 See H. R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 347 (1977); In re Streets & Beard Farm 
Partnership, 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500 
(2d Cir. 1963); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ~~ 365-01, 365-02, 365-05, 365-06, 365-08 (15th ed. 
1989). 
11 See, e.g., Rosenthal Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313,123 
N.E. 766 (1919); Isquith v. New York State Thruway Auth., 27 Misc. 2d 539, 542, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y.Ct. Cl. 1961) (thruway toll ticket as executory contract); Gerry v. 
Johnston, 85 Idaho 226,378 P.2d 198 (1963). Many contracts have been held to be executory, 
even where the performance obligation has not been obvious. For example, a lease has been 
held to be an executory contract because of the lessor's obligation not to interfere with the 
lessee's right of quiet enjoyment. See, e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 Bankr. 104, 
117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
12 For example, the franchisor may be unable to provide the products or perform the train-
ing or other services, if any, required under the franchise contract. 
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the dollar. \3 
The foregoing analysis of risks was illustrated by reference to a 
payment stream represented by a franchise contract. The same legal 
conclusions would obtain, however, for other types of future payment 
streams-such as leases, licenses, etc.-where a contract breach by 
the originator could raise a defense to payment by the obligors; or 
where the contract is an executory contract. 14 
IV. SEPARATING THE SOURCE OF PAYMENT 
FROM THE ORIGINATOR 
We have previously discussed the "source" of payment. The 
source of payment must be separated from the originator in the event 
the originator becomes troubled or bankrupt. It is therefore neces-
sary, first, to ensure that whatever happens to the originator cannot 
affect the SPY (often referred to as making the Spy "bankruptcy re-
mote") and, second, to ensure that the transfer of the receivables from 
the originator to the Spy cannot be interfered with (often referred to 
as creating a "true sale" of the receivables). 
A. Making the SPV "Bankruptcy Remote" 
The SPY itself must be insulated, to the extent practicable, from 
a possible bankruptcy of the originator. There are several ways the 
13 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). There is a further question that could arise in 
bankruptcy. Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that property acquired 
by a company after the commencement of a bankruptcy case is not subject to a lien resulting 
from a pre-bankruptcy security agreement. II U.S.C. § 552(a). Section 552(b) provides that 
proceeds of pre-bankruptcy property may be exempt from this restriction. 11 U.S.c. § 552(b). 
Where the SPV pays for a future payment stream, such as lease rentals, would the SPV be 
entitled to rentals paid after the originator goes bankrupt? At least one court has said yes. In 
United Virginia Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188 (4th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), the court held that payments made post-bank-
ruptcy under a coal supply contract were proceeds subject to a pre-bankruptcy lien, even 
where the bankrupt company would have to continue to supply the coal in order to be paid. 
Id. at 1190-91 (following In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984». Because § 552(b) 
allows a court to weigh the equities of each case, however, there is no assurance that a similar 
result will obtain in each case. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty Investment Co., 516 F.2d 154 
(1st Cir. 1975); In re Photo Promotion Associates, Inc., 61 Bankr. 936, 939-40 (Bankr. 
S.D. N.Y. 1986) (bankruptcy courts have considerable latitude under § 522(b». 
14 The nature of the receivable also can affect predictability of payment where the receiva-
ble is prepayable. If, for example, the receivables consisted of mortgage loans, and interest 
rates declined, the obligors might prepay the loans. Although the collections should then be 
sufficient to prepay the principal amount of the debt securities issued by the SPV, the holders 
of these securities may have bargained to have their securities outstanding for a longer period 
of time at a fixed interest rate. The problems associated with prepayments are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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originator's bankruptcy could affect the SPY, and each must be pro-
tected against. 
If the Spy is owned or controlled by the originator, 15 the origina-
tor may have the power to cause the SPY to file a voluntary petition 
for bankruptcy under section 303 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 16 
There are no legal standards that must be met for a voluntary petition 
to be filed. 17 It is therefore important to limit, by design, the ability of 
the originator to cause the SPY to file a voluntary bankruptcy.18 
This limitation normally is accomplished by drafting the SPY's 
charter or articles of incorporation or other organizational documents 
to restrict the circumstances under which it may' place itself in volun-
tary bankruptcy. Charters of SPVs sometimes provide that the Spy 
may not place itself into bankruptcy unless the SPY is insolvent and a 
requisite percentage of independent board members votes for bank-
ruptcy. Some SPVs are organized with at least two classes of stock; 
and both classes must vote affirmatively for bankruptcy in order for 
the SPY to file a voluntary petition. One class of stock then is pledged 
to, or otherwise controlled by, the holders of the Spy's securities. 19 
These methods are not infallible. Whether they are enforceable 
will depend upon the law of the particular jurisdiction of the SPY's 
15 Sometimes, for example, the SPY is a limited purpose subsidiary of the originator. 
16 11 U.S.c. § 303 (1988). 
17 The Federal Bankruptcy Code does not require any special procedures for a company to 
file a voluntary bankruptcy petition. A company would make this decision like any other 
significant decision. Unless restricted in its charter or bylaws, a corporation, for example, 
normally would make this decision by a vote of its board of directors. 
18 It appears to be against public policy to remove entirely a company's' power to place 
itself in voluntary bankruptcy. Cf. Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1966); In re 
Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 Bankr. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (prepetition 
agreement to avoid bankruptcy proceedings void as against public policy); In re Weitzen, 3 F. 
Supp. 698, 698-99 (S.D. N.Y. 1933) (agreement to waive benefits of bankruptcy unenforceable). 
19 If the holders of the SPY's securities control, by pledge or otherwise, a class of the SPY's 
voting stock, there is a question whether these holders may be exposed to liability claims for 
"controlling" the SPY. See, e.g., In re Sea-Land Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,923 (Del. Ch. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-17 (Del. 
1984); Gilbert v. EI Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984) for a discussion by the Delaware 
courts of what constitutes shareholder control and the type of liability which might accom-
pany such control. Related to this is the issue of whether the holders of the SPY's securities 
may vote against a bankruptcy proceeding for the SPY when such proceeding might be in the 
best interests of the equity owner of the Spy (i.e., the originator). Courts have held that when 
a creditor is able to exercise control of a corporation by voting pledged securities, it has a duty 
to use reasonable care to maintain the value of the collateral. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Data 
Lease Fin. Corp., 828 F.2d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 1987); cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1019 (1988); 
Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1972). But the 
creditor nonetheless has the right to protect its legitimate self-interest and need not fall back 
upon its debtor's recommendations in order to satisfy the duty of reasonable care. Bankers 
Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler & Co., 47 N.Y.2d 128, 390 N.E.2d 766, 417 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979). 
1990] STRUCTURED FINANCE 615 
formation. Delaware law presently appears to offer flexibility in 
approaches. 20 
Another approach is for the Spy to be neither owned nor con-
trolled by the originator. The Spy may, for example, be owned by an 
independent third party, such as a charitable institution. If the Spy 
continued to collect the receivables and pay on its securities even after 
the originator went bankrupt, the charity (or other third party) would 
have no incentive to place the SPY in bankruptcy. The SPY also 
could be structured as an entity that cannot become the subject of a 
federal bankruptcy case. One such entity is a trust, although "busi-
ness trusts"21 may be the subject of federal bankruptcy cases.22 
Once the SPY's power to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition is 
restricted, the next step is to limit the circumstances under which 
creditors can force the Spy into involuntary bankruptcy. Unlike vol-
untary bankruptcy, a creditor may not force an Spy into involuntary. 
bankruptcy unless the Spy meets the criteria required for filing. 23 
These criteria are that the Spy is either generally not paying its debts 
as they become due, or that a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, 
or agent, appointed or authorized to take charge of less than substan-
tially all of the property of the Spy for the purpose of enforcing a lien 
against such property, has been appointed or has taken possession.24 
One therefore may attempt to protect against involuntary bankruptcy 
by limiting both the debt that the SPY can issue and the number of 
trade creditors. (The number of trade creditors can be effectively lim-
ited by limiting the business in which the SPY can engage.) These 
limitations could be included, for example, in the SPY's charter or 
other organizational documents. Furthermore, any third parties that 
deal with the SPY contractually could be required to waive their re-
spective rights to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the 
SPY. 
20 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 102(b)(I), 121 (1988). If a majority of the voting 
shares of the spy is owned by the originator, the SPV and the originator may have to be 
consolidated for accounting purposes. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
94. 
21 A business trust is a trust that carries on a business for profit, as opposed to a non-
business trust which is created to hold and preserve the trust property. See Hecht v. Malley, 
265 U.S. 144, 159-62 (1924); W. Fletcher, 16A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private 
Corporations § 8267 (D. Nelson & M. Wasiunec rev. ed. 1988). 
22 See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.c. § 101(8)(A)(v) (1988). If the originator is an entity, 
such as a bank, that cannot become the subject of a federal bankruptcy case, the requirements 
for an Spy may be more lenient. See Bankrupcy Code, II U.S.c. § 109 (1988). 
23 Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code also has requirements for the number of credi-
tors and the types of claims necessary for filing an involuntary petition. II U.S.C. § 303(b) 
(1988). 
24 See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.c. § 303(h). 
616 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:607 
Eliminating creditors does not guaranty that the SPY will be pro-
tected from the originator's bankruptcy. An equitable doctrine of 
law, known as substantive consolidation, may allow a court under ap-
propriate circumstances to consolidate the assets and liabilities of the 
originator and the SPY. Although substantive consolidation usually 
arises in the context of a bankruptcy both of the originator and the 
SPY, a court could order a substantive consolidation even where the 
Spy is not in bankruptcy, or, in the alternative, place restrictions on 
the operations of the SPY notwithstanding that the SPY is not in 
bankruptcy.25 
Courts do not order substantive consolidation lightly. The deter-
mination that two entities should be substantively consolidated must 
be made on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of the relevant 
facts of each case. Courts will take into consideration both the nature 
of the relationship between the entities to be consolidated and the ef-
fect of the consolidation on the creditors of each entity. Among the 
factors to be considered for this purpose, the courts have identified the 
following: 
1. the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individ-
ual liabilities and assets; 
2. the presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; 
3. the commingling of assets and business functions; 
4. the unity of ownership and interests between the corporate 
entities; 
5. the guaranteeing by the parent of loans of the subsidiary; and 
6. the transfer of assets without formal observance of corporate 
formalities. 26 
The presence of some or even many of these factors does not, 
however, necessarily mean that a court will order a substantive con-
solidation. Recently, courts have held that because substantive con-
solidation is an equitable remedy, it should not be used to harm 
innocent holders of securities of the company (in our case, the SPY) 
that is the target of consolidation. 27 
It therefore would not appear likely that a court would substan-
25 See, e.g., Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) (consolidating 
the assets of corporation with those of its stockholders); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 1100.06 
[3], at 1100-44 to 1100-46 (15th ed. 1989). 
26 In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 Bankr. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); see discussion in 
5 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 1100.06 [3] (15th ed., 1989); Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. 
v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Manzey Land & Cattle 
Co., 17 Bankr. 332, 338 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982). 
27 See, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying consoli-
dation where one creditor would suffer unfairly); In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 239 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (court's power arises out of equity and should be used sparingly). 
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tively consolidate the assets and liabilities of an Spy and a bankrupt 
originator in a typical transaction. Nonetheless, substantive consoli-
dation is an equitable remedy and is highly dependent on the facts. 
The foregoing discussion has focused on limiting the circum-
stances under which the SPY, or its assets, could become subject to a 
federal bankruptcy case. Certain types of governmental claims, how-
ever, that arise against the originator may also be asserted against the 
SPY, regardless of whether the SPY is in bankruptcy. Under the 
United States Internal Revenue Code, for example,a cl~im can be 
asserted against any member of a consolidated tax group.28 If the 
SPY is a member of the originator's consolidated tax' group, as would 
be likely if the SPY is a subsidiary of the originator, the Internal Rev-
enue Service would be able to assert a claim that it has against the 
originator directly against the SPY.29 
Another type of governmental claim that may be asserted in this 
way is a pension claim. Certain governmental claims relating to de-
fined benefit pension plans can be asserted under the Internal Revenue 
Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA),30 as amended, against any trade or business under common 
control with the sponsor of the plan (a "controlled group").3! For 
example, if there are unfunded benefits payable upon the termination 
of a defined benefit pension plan, the sponsoring employer and each 
member of its controlled group, which could include the SPY, would 
be liable to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the 
agency responsible for administering the ERISA plan termination 
rules, for 100% of the unfunded benefits.32 In addition, the PBGC 
has a lien for its claim against the property of each member of the 
28 I.R.C. § 1502 (1988). 
29 Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6 states that the common parent corporation and each subsidiary 
that was a member of the group during any part of the consolidated return year shall be 
severally liable for the tax for such year unless the subsidiary has ceased to be a part of the 
group as the result of a bona fide sale or exchange for fair value prior to the date upon which 
the deficiency was assessed, in which case such liability may be limited. No agreement entered 
into by one or more members of the group with any other member or other person can elimi-
nate or reduce this liability. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-6 (1989). 
30 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in various sections of 26 U.S.C. 
(1988) and 29 U.S.c. (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
31 In general, a controlled group includes parent-subsidiary and brother-sister groups that 
are under 80% common ownership, and therefore may include an 80% owned SPV. 1.R.c. 
§ 414(b), (c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(b), (c), 26 C.F.R. §§ 1 & 602, 53 F.R. 6603 (1989); 
ERISA § 4OO1(b), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§ 401 (1982». 
32 ERISA § 4062(a), (b), 88 Stat. 829, 1029 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (a), 
(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
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group, up to 30% of the collective net worth of the group.33 The lien 
generally has the same status as a tax lien. 34 In addition, liability for 
unpaid contributions to an ongoing defined benefit pension plan ex-
tends to all members of the controlled group, and a lien on their prop-
erty (with the same status as a tax lien) will be imposed in favor of the 
PBGC if the unpaid contributions exceed a certain level. 35 These gov-
ernmental claims normally would have priority to claims of general 
security holders. 
It is possible, however, for the claims of holders of securities of 
the Spy to gain priority over governmental claims by the SPY's 
pledging its receivables to secure repayment of the securityholders. 
Such a pledge would come ahead of the governmental claims in most 
instances.36 
B. Creating a "True Sale" of the Receivables 
Having accomplished a separation of the originator and the SPY, 
it is important to ensure that ownership of the receivables is effec-
tively transferred to the SPY. This transfer is typically referred to as 
33 ERISA § 4068(a), 88 Stat. 829, 1032 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 1368 (a) 
(Supp. V 1987». The PBGC generally has great latitude in determining net worth, and ER-
ISA was recently amended to specifically provide that negative net worths of group members 
are not offset against positive net worths for these purposes. 29 U.S.c. § 1362(d)(I) (Supp. V 
1987». 
34 ERISA § 4068(c), 88 Stat. 829, 1032-33 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 6323 
(1982». 
35 I.R.C. § 412(c)(1I), (n); ERISA § 302(c), 88 Stat. 829, 871 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 1082(f)(3) (Supp. v 1987». 
36 See, e.g., In re National Fin. Alternatives, Inc., 96 Bankr. 844, 853-54 (Bankr. N.D. III. 
1989) (holding that receivables acquired by the debtor after a tax lien filed by the IRS had 
become effective were nevertheless "qualified property," i.e., property covered by the creditor's 
prior security interest, so long as they were the identifiable proceeds of a contract right ac-
quired prior to the effective date of the tax lien and had not been commingled with other 
monies or expended to acquire other properties after that date). Cf. U.C.c. §§ 9-301(4), 9-312 
(1989). 
Another issue that should be considered in connection with the establishment of the SPV 
is the extent to which it may be subject to income tax. Although a detailed discussion of tax 
issues is beyond the scope of this Article, a few key points should be noted. If the SPV is a 
corporation wholly-owned by a corporate originato'r, then it can be consolidated with the origi-
nator, at least for federal income tax purposes, eliminating a separate tax at the SPV level. (It 
mayor may not, however, be possible to consolidate or combine for state or local income tax 
purposes.) Similarly, if the SPV is a trust with respect to which the originator retains a suffi-
cient economic interest or control such that the SPV is treated as a so-called grantor-trust, 
there will be no tax at the SPV level, and any income of the SPV would simply be passed 
through to the originator, as grantor. Alternatively, it may be possible to structure an SPV 
that is a trust in such a way as to assure that it will be treated as a partnership, in which case it 
also would generally not be subject to a separate level of tax. In other cases the SPV may be 
subject to tax in its own right; it may in fact have little taxable income, however, because of 
offsetting deductions for interest paid on debt securities issued by it. 
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a "true sale." The term "true sale" is misleading, however, because a 
given transfer of receivables may well be a sale for certain purposes 
but not others. For example, the criteria for establishing an account-
ing sale under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), gov-
erned by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 77 (FAS 
77), are less stringent37 than the criteria for establishing a sale under 
bankruptcy law. 
The originator transferring its receivables to the Spy presumably 
would want the transfer to constitute a sale for accounting purposes. 
That way the financing is reflected on its balance sheet as a sale of 
assets and not as a secured loan (which would increase leverage). The 
originator also may want the transfer to be a sale for purposes of its 
indenture covenants, if such covenants restrict the originator's ability 
to incur debt or pledge its assets. In many cases, particularly where 
the indenture itself states that its interpretation is to be governed by 
GAAP, it may well be the case that a transfer which is an accounting 
sale also will be viewed as a sale under the indenture.38 Whether a 
given transfer of receivables violates one or more indenture or other 
contractual covenants, however, is a legal question that turns closely 
on the precise contractual language and usually would be best inter-
preted by the originator's own counsel. 
The term "true sale" most often is used in analyzing whether the 
transfer of receivables effectively has remov~d the receivables from the 
originator for bankruptcy purposes. If the originator goes bankrupt 
and the receivables are no longer owned by the originator but instead 
are owned by the SPY, then the SPY would own the collections on the 
receivables. Assuming the receivables were paid, the Spy then would 
have sufficient cash to pay its securities without defaulting. But if the 
transfer is held not to be a sale for bankruptcy purposes, it will be 
37 On February 23, 1989, at a meeting of the Financial Accounting Standard Board's 
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), the SEC observer ·stated that the SEC is becoming in-
creasingly concerned about certain receivables, leasing and other transactions involving special 
purpose vehicles. The SEC observer suggested, for the EITF's consideration, certain require-
ments that the SEC felt should be met in order for the transfers of receivables to be recognized 
as sales and to avoid consolidation of the SPY and the originator of the receivables. These 
requirements included that the majority owner of the SPV be an independent third party who 
has made a substantive capital investment in the SPV, has control of the SPV, and has substan-
tive risks and rewards of ownership of the receivables or other assets purchased by the SPY 
(including residuals). Although the SEC staff is said to be considering the issuance of a Staff 
Accounting Bulletin setting forth guidelines on the accounting for transactions involving 
SPYs, no such Bulletin has yet been issued. See EITF Abstracts, Issue No. 84-30. 
38 For example, the indenture covenant may restrict liens securing debt, although the term 
"debt" may not be defined in the indenture. Indentures often state that accounting terms used 
therein are to be construed in accordance with GAAP. A court therefore may use the GAAP 
definition of "debt," which is governed by FAS 77. 
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deemed an advance of funds by the SPY to the originator secured by 
the receivables. 39 The SPY would have a security interest, but not an 
ownership interest, in the receivables. In such a case, the originator's 
bankruptcy would, under section 362 of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code,4O automatically result in a stay of all actions by creditors to 
foreclose on or otherwise obtain property of the originator.41 
If the transfer of the receivables from the originator to the SPY is 
recharacterized by the bankruptcy court as a secured loan rather than 
as a sale, the Spy may not be able to obtain payments collected on the 
receivables until the stay is modified. Furthermore, under section 363 
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,42 a court, after notice to creditors 
and the opportunity of a hearing, could order the cash collections of 
the receivables to be used by the originator in its business as working 
capital if adequate protection of the interest of the Spy in the receiv-
ables is provided by the originator or its trustee.43 
In addition, section 364 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code44 also 
would permit the originator, if credit is not otherwise available to it 
and if adequate protection is given to the Spy, to raise cash by grant-
ing to new lenders a lien that is either pari passu with that of the Spy 
or, if a pari passu lien cannot attract new financing, having priority 
over the Spy's lien.45 
39 See P. Weil, Asset-Based Lending: An Introductory Guide to Secured Financing 195 
(1989). 
A related issue is whether a true sale of receivables can be avoided as a "fraudulent con-
veyance" if the SPY pays a purchase price that is less than the reasonably equivalent value of 
the receivables. This risk is minimal, however, in the typical structured financing because the 
purchase price for the receivables normally will be determined on an arm's length basis 
(although the fairness of the purchase price may be subject to greater scrutiny if the originator 
is a troubled company). For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance laws, see Schwarcz, The 
Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance Law on Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaran-
ties and Security Interests, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 729 (1987). 
40 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). 
41 Section 362(d) provides criteria for the judge to determine whether to lift the stay. 
Whether the stay will be lifted depends on the facts of the given case. See, e.g., In re Com-
coach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Sweetwater, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 
1220, 1227 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 57 Bankr. 748 (D. Utah 1985). 
42 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
43 Adequate protection is not defined in the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the Bank-
ruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 361, gives several examples of what may constitute adequate protec-
tion, such as making periodic cash payments to the creditor (§ 361(1» or giving a lien on other 
unencumbered property in the debtor's estate (§ 361(2», and leaves it for the courts to decide 
on a case by case basis what constitutes "adequate protection" in the circumstances. See, e.g., 
In re AIC Indus., 83 Bankr. 774, 777 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) ("adequate protection" pursuant 
to § 363); In re O.P. Held, Inc., 74 Bankr. 777, 782-84 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
For a thorough discussion of the issue of "adequate protection," see In re Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Assoc., 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1989). 
44 11 U.S.c. § 364. 
45 Bankruptcy Code § 364(d)(I) provides as follows: 
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Although various courts have considered whether a given trans-
fer of receivables constitutes a sale or a secured loan for bankruptcy 
purposes, the facts of the decided cases have not been representative 
for the most part of modern asset securitized transactions. Accord-
ingly, the cases are not easily harmonized, and different readers may 
argue as to which factors are relevant and which are entitled to 
greater weight. Nonetheless, a cluster of factors can be identified that 
are relevant in most determinations of whether a given receivables 
transfer is a sale or a secured loan.46 
1. Recourse 
The most significant factor appears to be the extent of recourse 
the transferee of the receivables has against the transferor. As the 
degree of recourse increases, the likelihood that a cohrt will find a true 
sale decreases. The existence of some recourse does not by itself pre-
clude characterization of the transaction as a true sale. If recourse is 
present, the issue is "whether the nature of the recourse, and the true 
nature of the transaction, are such that the legal rights and economic 
consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing 
transaction [that is, a secured loan] or to a sale."47 
Sometimes the seller represents and warrants that all receivables 
sold meet certain eligibility criteria, and the seller will provide an in-
demnity for breach of these representations and warranties. To the 
extent these representations and warranties are not general represen-
tations and warranties of collectibility, but rather are limited to the 
condition of the receivables at the time the receivables are sold, this 
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the 
incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is 
subject to a lien only if -
(A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and 
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the 
property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be 
granted. 
II u.s.c. § 364(d)(I). 
In practice, it is common for a secured lender in bankruptcy to work out an arrangement, 
approved by the court after notice and a hearing, whereby the lender in effect re-advances the 
cash collections it receives as new post-petition loans secured by future receivables of the com-
pany. For a discussion of these arrangements, see Schochet & Murphy, Financing the Debtor-
In-Possession: Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, 448 PU/Comm. 445 (1988); Schochet, 
Murphy & Germain, Post Petition Financing: Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, 487 PUI 
Comm. 213 (1989). 
46 Each of these factors is indicative of whether the originator truly has parted with the 
future economic risks and benefits of ownership of the receivables purported to be sold, and 
whether the SPV has taken on these risks and benefits. 
47 Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). 
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should be no different from a warranty ordinarily given by a seller of a 
product.48 Accordingly, such limited representations and warranties 
and indemnity should not be inconsistent with sale treatment. 
2. Retained Rights and Right to Surplus 
Perhaps the second most important factor indicating a secured 
transaction is the transferor's right to redeem or repurchase trans-
ferred receivables. For example, section 9-506 of the vee and vari-
ous state mortgage statutes49 allow a debtor to redeem property before 
it is ultimately disposed of by a secured party. The absence of a right 
of redemption or repurchase would be a factor in favor of characteri-
zation of the receivables transaction as a true sale. 
Several courts also have considered the existence of a transferor's 
right to any surplus collections, once the transferee has collected its 
investment plus an agreed yield, as indicative of a secured loan. 50 The 
right of the transferee of the receivables to retain all collections of 
transferred receivables for its own account, even after the transferee 
has collected its investment plus yield, would therefore be a factor in 
favor of characterization of the receivables transaction as a true sale. 
3. Pricing Mechanism 
Pricing based upon a fluctuating interest index of the type found 
in commercial loan agreements, such as the prime or base rate, may 
be indicative of a secured loan. The pricing mechanism also may be 
indicative of a secured loan to the extent the purchase price is retroac-
tively adjusted to reflect actual rather than ~xpected collections on 
receivables. 51 
In the closest approach to a true sale, the SPV would purchase 
receivables at a discount calculated to cover the SPV's funding cost 
(as well as risk of loss). The discount would be fixed for ea,ch sale, 
48 See U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1989). 
49 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-506 (Supp. 1988). 
50 See, e.g., In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 Bankr. 659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1982); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 Bankr. 609, 617 (Bankr.:W.D. Ky. 1982); In re 
Nixon Machinery Co., 6 Bankr. 847, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). 
51 See Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 u.s. 568 (1916); Dorothy v. Commonwealth 
Commercial Co., 278 Ill. 629, 116 N.E. 143 (1917). A conservative approach would be for 
purchases to be made on a discounted basis. The discount could be negotiated p.rior to each 
purchase, in part based on the purchaser's then net current cost of funds and the anticipated 
collection experience of the receivables then to be purchased. Once a discount has been negoti-
ated for each purchase, it would not thereafter be modified or otherwise adjusted for that 
purchase, irrespective of differences between the actual versus anticipated cost of funds and 
collection experience. Such pricing would be a factor in favor of characterization of the receiv-
ables transaction as a true sale. 
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and would not be retroactively adjusted to cover the actual funding 
cost. 
4. Administration and Collection of Accounts 
The administration of and control over the collection of accounts 
receivable are factors sometimes cited by courts in resolving the sale/ 
secured loan issue. 52 To be a true purchase, the transferee should 
have the authority to control the collection of the accounts. 53 Exam-
ples of such authority would include (1) ownership by the transferee 
of all the books, records and computer tapes relating to the purchased 
receivables, and (2) the transferee's having the right to (a) control the 
activities of any collection agent with respect to purchased receivables 
and at any time to appoint itself or another person as collection agent, 
(b) establish credit and collection policy with respect to purchased 
receivables, and (c) at any time notify the obligors of the purchased 
receivables of the sale. 
In practice, the seller often is appointed as the collection agent 
initially. This is not necessarily inconsistent with sale characteriza-
tion if (1) the seller, as collection agent, will be acting as an agent for 
the purchaser pursuant to established standards, much like any other 
agent, (2) the seller will receive a collection agent fee that represents 
an arm's length fee for these services, and (3) the purchaser has the 
right at any time to appoint itself or another person as collection 
agent in place of the seller. 
Sometimes collections of the purchased receivables are paid to 
the originator and commingled, or mixed, with the originator's gen-
eral funds. This frequently occurs where the originator collects the 
receivables each day, but only remits the collections periodically (such 
as monthly) to the SPY. Besides raising a potential perfection ques-
tion under the vee,54 commingling' would, if permitted by the SPY, 
appear to be inconsistent with the concept of a sale: the originator 
would be using collections that belong to the SPY. This inconsistency 
often can be addressed by the originator's segregating and holding the 
collections in trust, pending remittance to the SPY. 55 
52 One interesting discussion of this question occurs in the British case, Lloyds & Scottish 
Finance Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd., House of Lords, 29 March 1979 (transcript 
available on LEXIS). 
S3 People v. Service Inst., Inc., 101 Misc. 2d 325, 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
54 See text accompanying footnotes 58-69. 
ss Alternatively, the SPV may be able to lend proceeds to the originator, although this 
approach has limited precedent. 
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5. Additional Factors 
The courts have identified a variety of other factors that do not 
fall within the categories discussed above but which may be indicative 
of a secured loan. 56 . Among the more significant of these factors are 
the following: 
(a) the originator of receivables is a debtor of the SPY on or 
before the purchase date; 
(b) the SPY's rights in the receivables can be extinguished by 
payments or repurchases by the originator or by payments from 
sources other than collections on receivables; 
(c) the originator is obligated to pay the SPY's costs (including 
attorneys' fees) incurred in collecting delinquent or uncollectible 
receivables; 
(d) the language of the documentation contains references to 
the transfer being "security for" a debt; and· 
(e) the parties' intent, as evidenced by the documentation and 
their actions, suggests that the parties view the transaction as a secur-
ity device. Also of importance is how the parties account for the 
transaction on their books, records, and tax returns. 
It is rare in modern commercial transactions for all the factors 
favoring a true bankruptcy sale to be met. There is inevitably a bal-
ance. Some recourse is needed to give a reasonable assurance to hold-
ers of the SPY's securities that they will be paid. It may be 
uneconomic for an originator to agree that the Spy obtains the entire 
surplus of collections once holders of the SPY's securities are paid. In 
each case the parties structuring the transaction will have to balance 
how important it is that the transaction be a bankruptcy sale with the 
other commercial desires of the investors and the originator. This 
balance will depend, in large part, on the credit quality of the origina-
tor. It may be less important to investors to insist on a true sale where 
the originator has an investment grade rating than where the origina-
tor is troubled or in a workout. 57 
C. Additional Steps Required Under the UCC 
to Protect the Transfer 
Once the SPY has been created and the transaction structured, it 
56 See P. Weil, supra note 39, at 23-37. 
57 A company sometimes may require that the receivables transfer be a loan for tax pur-
poses so as, for example, to avoid recognition of a taxable gain that would be triggered if the 
transfer is treated as a tax sale. Because the bankruptcy and tax sale criteria, although not 
identical, are similar-and the bankruptcy cases may apply even closer scrutiny than the 
IRS-structuring a receivables transfer as a bankruptcy sale may well make it also a tax sale. 
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still will be necessary to take certain steps to protect the transfer of 
receivables against claims of third parties and in bankruptcy. The 
Vniform Commercial Code (VCC), adopted (with only minor varia-
tion) in every state of the Vnited States,58 provides in section 9-102 
that each transfer of an interest in "accounts" and "chattel paper," 
whether or not intended as a transfer for security or a transfer of ac-
tual ownership, must be perfected by one of the procedures set forth 
in the VCC (usually accomplished by the filing of VCC-l financing 
statements). 59 The commentary to this section (Official Comment 
No.2) explains that the draftsmen had difficulty trying to set guide-
lines on whether a given transfer was a sale or a secured loan, and 
therefore established the same filing requirement in both cases. The 
purpose of the filing is to place third parties on notice of the transfer 
of the interest in the receivables, so they will not be misled when ex-
tending credit to or otherwise dealing with the originator.60 
The failure to perfect, in accordance with the requirements of the 
VCC, can have serious consequences. The secured party or purchaser 
may not be able to enforce its rights as against later secured creditors 
who file financing statements covering the same receivables or as 
against the originator's trustee in bankruptcy.61 
Curiously, although section 9-102 of the VCC refers to transfers 
of "accounts" and "chattel paper," it does not refer to, and therefore 
by its terms does not apply to, sales of other types of payment 
streams. "Account" is defined in VCC section 9-106 as "any right to 
payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not 
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has 
been earned by performance." "Chattel paper" is defined in VCC sec-
tion 9-105( 1 )(b) as follows: 
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a 
58 Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as such. However, Articles 1, 
3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the UCC have been adopted in substance as title 10, Commercial Laws, of 
the Louisiana Revised Statutes, chapters 1,3,4 and 5 (Act No. 92 of 1974, effective January 1, 
1975), Acts No. 164, 165 of 1978 (effective January 1, 1979); Article 9 was adopted by Act No. 
528 of 1988, effective July 1, 1989, effective date extended to January 1, 1990 by No. 12 of the 
1989 Extraordinary Session. U.C.c. Rep. Servo (Callaghan), State Correlation Tables, Louisi-
ana (1989). 
59 Chattel paper, however, also can be perfected by the secured party or buyer taking pos-
session of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1989). 
60 Any argument that the filing of UCC-l financing statements indicates the parties' inten-
. tion that the transaction constitutes a secured loan and not a sale can be obviated by stating on 
the financing statement that the intention is to create a sale and that the filing is being made 
because the UCC requires it. 
61 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988); In re Communications Co. of Am., 84 
Bankr. 822, 824 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Kambourelis, 8 Bankr. 138, 141 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific 
goods, but a charter or other contract involving the use or hire of a 
vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both 
by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a 
series of instruments, the group of writings taken together consti-
tutes chattel paper. 
Many common types of payment streams, such as fees payable under 
a franchise contract, may not fall into either of these categories. In-
deed the vee has other categories, including a catch-all category of 
"general intangibles," into which any payment stream falls that is not 
included in a specific category.62 
Does the failure of vee section 9-102 to refer to the sale of gen-
eral intangibles mean that the draftsmen intended that no legal steps 
need be taken under the vee to perfect such sale, or does this failure 
mean that the vee was not intended to vary whatever common law 
requirements were applicable to sales of intangibles? The vee offers 
..; no clue. 
The answer to this question, however, can have practical conse-
quences. Prior to enactment of the vee, different states had varying 
requirements as to how to protect the interest of a purchaser of ac-
counts receivable and other intangibles. One line of cases, followed in 
New York and various other states, provided that a sale is not per-
fected where the transferor retains "unfettered" dominion over collec-
tions.63 A minority line of cases, following the English rule,64 
required notice to be given to the obligors on the receivables in order 
to perfect. 
It is unclear, as a matter of law, whether these pre-Vee perfec-
tion requirements continue to apply to sales of intangibles that are 
neither accounts nor chattel paper under the vee.65 Such a result 
would create commercial confusion because of the varying and con-
flicting state requirements. Perhaps a better approach is to recognize 
that it is the universally followed procedure for anyone who extends 
secured credit or is concerned about collateral to search the vee 
records. For example, if a company were merely to pledge, as op-
posed to selling, its intangibles, there is no question that the vee, 
which by its terms covers the granting of a security interest in "gen-
62 U.C.C. § 9-106. 
63 See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 3~3, 364-65 (1925). 
64 Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475, 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 478 (1823, 1827); Corn 
Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. K1auder, 318 U.S. 434, 437 (1943). 
65 U.C.C. § 1-103 states that principles of common law not inconsistent with the UCC will 
continue to apply. This is the so-called "Swiss Cheese" principle, because the common law fills 
the holes in the UCC-cheese. 
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eral intangibles," would apply.66 It therefore would appear illogical 
and inequitable for a buyer that has filed Uee-l financing statements 
to be penalized because it did not also follow common law perfection 
procedures that may be commercially impracticable in today's world. 
There are, however, no decided cases offering furtherlguidance. 
Sometimes the payment stream sold will be evidenced by a prom-
issory note or other negotiable writing evidencing an obligation to pay 
money. Under the uee, these are classified as "instruments" and, 
because they are negotiable, can only be perfected by the buyer taking 
possession.67 . 
A further concern arises under the uee where the collections 
from the purchased receivables are not paid directly to the SPY but 
instead are paid to the originator and commingled, or mixed, with the 
originator's general funds. uee section 9-306(4) provides that, in the 
event of the originator's "insolvency proceeding" (presumably mean-
ing bankruptcy), collections of the receivables that are commingled 
may lose their perfected status and be subject to claims of other credi-
tors and the trustee-in-bankruptcy.68 In appropriate cases, particu-
larly with financially weak originators, collections of receivables 
purchased by the Spy may be required to be paid by obligors directly 
to lockboxes at banks that do not contain the originator's general 
funds or to lockboxes owned by the SPY. The Spy could enter into 
agreements giving it the right to take over lockboxes under appropri-
ate circumstances. Alternatively, if adequate lockbox arrangements 
cannot be established, an Spy may obtain the right to notify obligors 
to make payments directly to the SPY.69 
Y. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
Structuring an asset securitized financing frequently impacts on a 
number of federal and state regulatory schemes. The issuance of se-
curities by the SPY, as well as an originator's transfer of receivables to 
the SPY, may raise the issue of·whether registration under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (the" 1933 Act"yo and state "blue sky" laws is re-
quired and whether, as a result of·such issuance and transfer, the SPY 
66 See u.c.c § 9-102(1)(a). 
67 See U.CC §§ 9-105,9-305 (1989). 
68 U.CC § 9-306(4). 
69 An SPV may be reluctant, however, to give such a notice, and an obligor receiving such 
a notice may choose to ignore it until the obligor receives reasonable proof that the receivables 
have been sold. See U.C.C. § 9-318(3). 
70 Pub. L. No. 22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77bbbb 
(1988)). The 1933 Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the 
appropriate current section in 15 U.S.C. 
628 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:607 
inadvertently has become an "investment company" within the mean-
ing of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act").71 
Moreover, there may be special concerns (discussed below) if the orig-
inator is itself a regulated industry or financial institution. 
A. Investment Company Act of 1940 
Beginning first with the investment company issue, the 1940 Act 
provides that any entity principally engaged in owning or holding "se-
curities" must, subject to certain exemptions, register with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as an invest-
ment company.72 The 1940 Act was promulgated as part of the com-
prehensive federal securities legislation enacted in the 1930s to curb a 
number of perceived abuses in the United States securities markets, to 
protect the public from being defrauded, and to ensure adequate con-
trols and information. Unlike the 1933 Act and the non-broker/ 
dealer sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 
Act"),73 which focus principally on the adequacy of disclosure in con-
nection with the issuance, sale, and trading of securities, the 1940 Act 
is a comprehensive, substantive regulatory scheme. Compliance with 
the 1940 Act is generally very costly and burdensome.74 Accordingly, 
registration of an SPV as an investment company is generally consid-
ered economically infeasible, and transactions are structured so as to 
fall within various statutory exemptions from 1940 Act registration. 
71 Pub. L. No. 768, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a (1988». 
The 1940 Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the appropri-
ate current section in 15 U.S.C. 
n One can perhaps intuitively understand the purpose behind the 1940 Act if one views a 
company that is principally engaged in owning or holding securities as a miniature stock ex-
change, and investors in the company as investors in stock traded on the exchange. 
73 Pub. L. No. 291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988». The 1934 
Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the appropriate current 
section in 15 U.S.C. 
74 For example, the 1940 Act imposes the following general requirements on registered 
investment companies: (i) restrictions on capital structure (e.g., prohibitions or restrictions on 
the issuance of debt securities), § 18, as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-18 (1988); (ii) restrictions 
on the composition of the Board of Directors or other governing body (e.g., limits on the 
number of "interested persons" appointed), §§ 10 and 16, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-IO, 
16; (iii) restrictions on investment activities (e.g., limits on investments in other investment 
companies), §§ 12(d), (e), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(d), (e); (iv) regulation of advert is-
ing (e.g., filing of sales literature with the Securities and Exchange Commission), § 24(b), as 
amended,' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b); (v) required shareholder votes on a number of issues (e.g., 
approval of advisor contracts, changes in investment policies and appointment of auditors), 
§ 13, 15(d), 31, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-13, 15(d), 31; (vi) ongoing reporting and disclo-
sure requirements, §§ 29, 30, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-29, 30; and (vii) extensive and 
complicated controls on pricing of investment company shares, § 22, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-22. 
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Under section 3(a) of the 1940 Act,75 an investment company is 
defined in relevant part as (1) an entity which is "engaged primarily 
... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities"76 
or (2) an entity "engaged" in such business, which "owns or proposes 
to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per cen-
tum of the value of such [entity's] total assets (exclusive of Govern-
ment securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis."77 The 
term "security" is defined broadly under section 2(a)(36) to include 
notes, stocks, bonds, evidences of indebtedness, transferable shares, 
investment contracts, and "any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security.' "78 
Most receivables and payment streams appear to fall within the 
definition of the term "security" under the 1940 Act because they are 
"evidences of indebtedness.'179 Nevertheless, several effective exemp-
tions from registration as an investment company may be available to 
an SPY. The most frequently used is section 3(c)(5)(A) of the 1940 
Act,80 which excludes from the definition of "investment company" 
entities that are "primarily engaged" in acquiring or holding receiv-
ables that constitute "notes, drafts, acceptances, open accounts receiv-
able, and other obligations representing part or all of the sales price of 
merchandise, insurance, and services. "81 
Many, but not all, types of receivables will fall under the section 
3(c)(5)(A) exclusion. These will generally include the most common-
place type of receivable-trade accounts receivable-since they 
clearly represent the purchase price of merchandise.82 Other types of 
receivables may not, however, come clearly within the section 
75 § 3(a), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(a). 
76 § 3(a)(l), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1). 
77 § 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3). 
78 § 2(a)(36), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (originally at § 2(a)(35), 54 Stat. 789, 
795). Under § 3(a), the term "investment securities" is defined to include all securities except 
Government securities, securities issued by employees' securities companies, and securities is-
sued by majority-held subsidiaries (provided the owner is not itself an investment company). 
§ 3(a), as amended, 15 U.S.c. at § 80a-3(a) .. 
79 § 2(a)(36), as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 80a-2(a)(36). 
80 § 3(c)(5)(A), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A) (amending § 3(c)(6)(A), 54 Stat. 
789, 798-99). 
81 Id. Section 3(c)(5)(B) similarly exempts entities primarily engaged in making loans to 
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and prospective purchasers of "specified merchandise, 
insurance, and services." § 3(c)(5)(B), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)( B) (1988). Under 
§ 3(c)(5)(C), entities primarily engaged in "purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and 
other liens on and interests in real estate" are also excluded from the definition of investment 
company under the 1940 Act. § 3(c)(5)(C), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C). It is this 
latter exemptive provision which originally was used in securitizing mortgage loans. 
82 § 3(c)(5)(A), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(5)(A) (sales price of merchandise). 
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3(c)(5)(A) exclusion.83 In some ofthese instances, however, it may be 
possible to obtain a "no-action" letter84 from the SEC, which will in 
practice have basically the same effect as an exemption from invest-
ment company registration. 
In Days Inn of America, Inc., 85 for example, the SEC staff stated 
that it would not recommend enforcement action under section 
3(c)(5)(A) if a wholly-owned subsidiary of Days Inn acquired certain 
franchise fee receivables from Days Inn (through another subsidiary), 
privately. issued and sold notes secured by those receivables, and 
loaned the net proceeds from the note sales to Days Inn to refinance 
certain indebtedness of the parent company. The receivables were 
characterized as obligations representing part or all of the sales price 
of various services rendered by Days Inn to its franchisees and on that 
basis were found to fall within the scope of section 3(c)(5)(A).86 
Where section 3(c)(5)(A) does not cover the receivables in ques-
tion, other exemptions may be available. Under section 3(c)(I) of the 
1940 Act,87 for example, "[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities 
(other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more 
than one hundred persons and which is not irtaking arid does not pres-
ently propose to make a pUblic offering of its securities"88 is excluded 
from the definition of investment company. This so-called "private 
investment company" exemption is frequently used in conjunction 
83 The SEC has repeatedly emphasized the legislative history of §§ 3(c)(5)(A) and (B), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(5)(A),(B) (originally §§ 3(c)(6)(A) and (B) of 1940 Act, 54 
Stat: 789, 798-99), which indicates that those sections were intended to exclude sales finance 
companies, factoring companies, and similar entities from the scope of the 1940 Act. In ihe 
case of § 3(C)(5)(B), the SEC staff has interpreted that exemption somewhat narrowly and has 
refused, for example, to issue no-action letters to companies engaged in making general work-
ing capital loans. See, e.g., Alleco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 88-165 (July 14, 
1988) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (Section 3(c)(5)(B) does not include "a loan that 
does not relate to the purchase price of specific goods or services even if the loan is secured by 
the same kind of collateral that secures a sales financing loan. "). The staff has indicated, how-
ever, that it is currently reviewing "the application of Section 3(C)(5) to various commercial 
finance activities to determine whether existing staff interpretations should be refined or modi-
fied." Id. 
84 A "no action" letter is a non-binding response by the SEC staff to a private inquiry 
indicating that the staff of the SEC will not recommend to the SEC that any enforcement 
action be taken if a proposed transaction is carried out in a specified manner. 
85 SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 88-688-CC (December 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDSEC 
library, No-Act file). 
86 See also, Ambassador Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 86-402-CC (Sept. 
4, 1986) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (purchase of air travel credit card program 
accounts receivable falls within § 3(c)(5)(A»; Woodside Group, SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. 
No. 81-713-CC (March 15, 1982) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (same result regard-
ing acquisition of equipment/facilities lease purchase and option agreements). 
87 § 3(c)(I), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(c)(I) (1988). 
88 Id. 
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with the private offering exemption under the 1933 Act (discussed 
below) to place interests in an SPY with a limited number of institu-
tional investors and other holders. 89 . 
If no statutory exemption is clearly available, sections 3(b )(2)90 
and 6(C)91 of the 1940 Act permit an Spy to petition the SEC to issue 
an order exempting the Spy from registration on the grounds that 
either (1) the Spy is primarily engaged in a business other than that 
of investing, owning, or trading in securities (under section 3(b)(2)92) 
or (2) an exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
and is consistent with the protection of investors and the other pur-
poses of the 1940 Act (under section 6(C)93). Obtaining a decision on 
such an application may take several months, and certainly there is no 
guaranty that an exemptive order will ultimately be issued by the 
SEC. Nevertheless, sometimes there is no alternative if investment 
company regi~tration is not cost-effective. 
B. Securities Act of 1933 arzd Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Even if an Spy establishes an exemption from registration under 
the 1940 Act, it will still be subject to the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act 
to the extent that it issues non-exempt securities. The 1934 Act im-
poses standards of disclosure and liability for certain types of fraudu-
lent statements or. omissions, as well as registration and on-going 
reporting requirements for certain publicly-held issuers. The 1933 
Act also imposes standards of disclosure94 and requires the filing of a 
registration statement with the SEC in connection with any public 
offering of non-exempt securities.95 
In weighing methods of compliance with the 1933 Act, an SPY 
will often choose to file a registration statement with the SEC and 
issue its securities as part of a public offering. Although such registra-
89 In placing interests with institutional investors and other entities under the 100 person 
or less exemption set forth in § 3(c)(I), care must be taken to comply with the rule for deter-
mining beneficial ownership under § 3(c)(I)(A). Pursuant to that subsection, beneficial owner-
ship by a company is generally deemed to be ownership by only one person. In an important 
exception to that general rule, however, it is necessary to look through the investing company 
and count its ultimate security holders if the company owns 10% or more of the outstanding 
securities of the SPV unless the value of all securities owned by such company in all issuers 
exempted under § 3(c)(I), together with all securities in issuers which would be exempt there-
under were it not for the beneficial ownership rules, does not exceed 10% of the investing 
company's total assets. 
90 § 3(b)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1988). 
91 § 6(c), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-6(c). 
92 § 3(b)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2). 
93 § 6(c), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c). 
94 §§ 7, 10, as amended, 15 U.S.C §§ 77g, 77h (1985). 
95 § 5(c), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c). 
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tion may take several months and is therefore somewhat time-con-
suming, as well as costly, registered securities issued by an SPY have 
the advantage of being freely issuable to and traded by the public. 
If a public market is not necessary or if a public offering would 
preclude a necessary "private investment company" exemption under 
the 1940 Act, the SPY may choose instead to issue its securities in a 
private placement under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act,96 which ex-
empts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."97 
If the private placement is made to a relatively few large institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and banks, relatively little in the way 
of specialized disclosure documents may be required; such investors 
are generally presumed to have the sophistication and bargaining 
power to elicit from the issuer and its sponsors the financial and other 
information necessary to make an informed investment decision. 
If the private placement is to a larger number of investors, and 
particularly if non-institutional investors are involved, the SPY may 
find it prudent to comply with the "safe harbor" provisions of Regula-
tion 0 promulgated by the SEC.98 Under that rule, the SPY may, in 
general, sell its securities to up to 35 "non-accredited" investors and 
an unlimited number of "accredited" investors.99 If "non-accredited" 
investors are included, it will generally be necessary to prepare and 
circulate a private offering memorandum setting forth certain finan-
cial and other information required to be furnished under Regulation 
D. 
Regardless of whether the Regulation D safe harbor is used, se-
curities issued in a private placement will generally be deemed to be 
"restricted securities" and may not be resold except in compliance 
with SEC Rule 144.100 In general, that rule imposes a two-year hold-
ing period unless the securities are resold in another private transac-
tion (in which case the securities will generally continue to be 
"restricted" in the hands of the buyer). 101 
96 § 4(2), as amended, IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (originally at Pub. L. No. 22, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 74, 
77 (1933». 
97 Id. 
98 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.S01-S06 (1989). 
99 In addition to banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors, the catego-
ries of accredited investors under Regulation D include individuals with a net worth of $1 
million or more and partnerships and corporations with total assets in excess of $S million. 17 
C.F.R. §§ 230.S01(a)(S), (3). 
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1989). 
101 The SEC has proposed Rule l44A, which would, in general, provide an additional "safe 
harbor" exemption for resales of restricted securities (with certain exceptions) to "qualified 
institutional buyers," including banks, insurance companies, and broker-dealers, provided that 
such buyers had more than $100 million in securities purchased for their own account during 
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Certain other exemptions may be available under the 1933 Act to 
an SPY that wishes to issue its securities in the public market but 
wants to avoid the time and cost of filing a registration statement. If 
the securities are supported by a bank letter of credit,- for example, the 
securities would be exempt from registration under section J(a)(2) of 
the 1933 Act. 102 Under the more frequently used section 3(a)(3) 
"commercial paper exemption," securities having a. maturity of no 
longer than nine months,103 the proceeds of which are to be used for 
"current transactions," are also free from the registration require-
ments of the 1933 ACt. I04 
The only difficulty with the section 3(a)(3) exemption is that the 
central requirement of a "current transaction"105 is not defined any-
where in the 1933 Act. It is therefore necessary to turn to various 
SEC no-action letters interpreting what is and is not a current trans-
action under various circumstances. In general, those letters indicate 
that a "current transaction" is a transaction which is undertaken by 
an issuer in the ordinary course of its business operations and which 
has a relatively short duration. 106 
their most recent fiscal year. ReI. No. 33-6839, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1313 (July II, 1989). It is 
anticipated that this rule, if adopted, will ihcrease the efficiency and liquidity of the private 
placement market. 53 Fed. Reg. 44016 (1988). 
102 § 3(a)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 7c(a)(2) (1988). Unlike § 4(2), as amended, 15 
U.S.C. § 77d(2), which is a "transactional" exemption applicable to all types of securities, § 3 
of the 1933 Act exempts entire specified classes of securities from the registration requirements 
of that act. § 3, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c. Section 3(a){2) includes among those classes 
"securities ... guaranteed by any bank," with the term "bank" defined to mean "any national 
bank, or banking institution organized under the laws of any State, territory, or the District of 
Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is supervised by the 
State or territorial banking commission or similar official." § 3(a)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.c. 
§ 77c(a)(2). This exemption is not often used in structured financings because the letter of 
credit typically covers only a portion of the securities. 
103 I.e., 270 days. 
104 Specifically, § 3(a)(3) exempts "[a]ny note;-draft, bill of exchange, or banker's accept-
ance which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be 
used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceed-
ing nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of wl:lich is 
likewise limited." § 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(3) (1988). Commercial paper may 
also be privately placed without registration under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, as amended, 15 
U.S.c. § 77d(2) (discussed supra note 1(0), but this approach is less common. 
105 § 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3). 
106 See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (April 3, 1986) 
(LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (proceeds used for equipment financing, acquisition of 
personal property through foreclosure, short-term commercial loans, accounts receivable 
loans, inventory loans, and floor plan loans aU constitute current transactions); Independence 
Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. II, 1986) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) 
(proceeds used for various transactions having maturities not exceeding five years all constitute 
current transactions); American Fletcher Mortgage Investors, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. ·2, 
1971) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (construction mortgage loans and warehousing 
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It also should be noted that, regardless of whether an SPV issues 
exempt securities or issues non-exempt securities in an exempt trans-
action or a registered public offering, the anti-fraud provisions of sec-
tion lO(b) of the 1934 Act107 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the SEC 
thereunder108 will apply. Accordingly, an SPV would be liable if, in 
connection with the issuance and sale of its securities, it employed 
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or if it made "any untrue 
statement of a material fact or [omitted] to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circum-
stances under which they were made; not misleading."109 
C. Other Regulatory Requirements 
If the' originator transferring its receivables to the SPV is in a 
regulated industry or is a financial institut~on, the laws, rules, and 
regulations applicable to it also may apply. In the case of a bank, for 
example, transferring its own assets to an SPV, or underwriting asset 
securitization for a third party, the Glass-Steagall Act llO may restrict 
the bank's actions. Indeed, the power of a bank to underwrite the sale 
of interests in securitized assets is an issue of current controversy. In 
1987, the Comptroller of the Currency had determined that the sale 
by Security Pacific National Bank of mortgage pass-through certifi-
cates, repre~enting fractional undivided interests in a pool of Security 
Pacific's own mortgage loans, was not in violation of the prohibitions 
on bank underwriting contained in the Glass-Steagall Act. III The 
Glass-Steagall Act was a response to widespread bank failures after 
the stock market crash of 1929 and was intended to protect banks 
from the risks of investment banking activities, such as underwriting. 
The Act applies to all national banks and state banks that are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System. The Comptroller's rationale, 
however, was that the sale by a bank of its own assets was riot "under-
writing" of the type prohibited by Glass-Steagall; and the fact that the 
assets were being sold through the mechanism of pooling did not 
change this essential nature. 
The Comptroller's determination subsequently was challenged 
by the Securities Industry Association. In 1988, a federal district 
loans with commitments for permanent takeouts in three years constitute current transactions, 
but development mortgage loans maturing in five years or less do not). 
107 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) .. 
108 SEC Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1989). 
109 Id. 
110 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as 
amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.) (commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act). 
III See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1036 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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court judge rejected the Comptroller's position. I 12 In September, 
1989, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's decision and decided in favor of the Comptroller's posi-
tion. I \3 The court reasoned that banking activities that are explicitly 
authorized by statute, and the exercise of "all such incidental powers 
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking," I 14 are per-
mitted to banks notwithstanding that such activities may constitute 
underwriting or other investment banking activities. 115 The court fol-
lowed another circuit court of appeals in including in a bank's "inci-
dental powers" any activity that is "convenient [and] useful in 
connection with the performance of one of the bank's established ac-
tivities pursuant to its express powers." I 16 The court held that Secur-
ity Pacific's use of mortgage pass-through certificates was indeed 
"convenient [and] useful" in connection with its express power to sell 
its own mortgage loans:117 
There has been speculation over how broadly the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion can be read and whether it may have application to 
bank underwriting of pooled assets originated by third parties. I 18 The 
Securities Industry Association, after originally announcing its inten-
tion to appeal the case to the Supreme Court, decided to drop the 
appeal and to focus instead on lobbying for limitations on bank under-
writing powers.119 The Federal Reserve Board, however, recently has 
expanded the ability of a bank to underwrite, through non-bank sub-
sidiaries (known as "section 20 subsidiaries," because they are created 
pursuant to powers found in section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act I2o), 
certain types of securities (including securities backed by mortgage 
and consumer receivables).121 And so the saga continues. 
112 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 703 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
I \3 Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1034. 
114 Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1043 (quoting § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 24 (1988». 
115 Id. at 1043. 
116 Id. at 1044 (quoting Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972». 
117 Id. at 1049. 
118 For example, because a bank has explicit power to buy a mortgage loan from a third 
party and subsequently sell it, could the bank buy mortgage loans with the intention of pooling 
them for securitization? 
119 See N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1989, at 33. 
120 § 20,48 Stat. 162, 188 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. § 377 (1988». 
121 The Federal Reserve Board originally had given section 20 subsidiaries the power to 
underwrite these types of securities backed by receivables originated by third parties. The 
recent (September 1989) expansion of these powers allows section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite 
these types of securities backed by receivables originated by the bank or its affiliates. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, asset securitization has significant potential for en-
abling companies to obtain economically advantageous financing 
without necessarily increasing leverage. Parties wishing to take ad-
vantage of asset securitization, however, may encounter many com-
plex legal pitfalls. A well designed structured financing will minimize 
and avoid these pitfalls. 
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ApPENDIX 
Balance Sheet Impact of Securitizing Assets 
Assets 






Equity $100 Debt/Equity = 
1. If XYZ Company borrows $100, secured by its receivables: 
Assets Liabilities Equity Ratios worsen 
Cash $100 Debt $200 Equity $100 Debt/Equity = 2 
Receivables $100 
Equipment $100 
2. But if XYZ Company sells $100 of its receivables: 
Assets Liabilities Equity Ratios unchanged 
Cash $100 Debt $100 Equity $100 Debt/Equity = 1 
Equipment $100 
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3. And if XYZ Company then uses $90, for example, of the cash to pay 
oft' debt, its ratio of debt to equity dramatically improves: 
Assets Liabilities Equity Ratios improve 
Cash $10 Debt $10 Equity $100 Debt/Equity = 1/10 
Equipment $100 

